

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

TRANSFORMING INITIAL ENTRY TRAINING TO SUPPORT A NATION AT WAR

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ABSTRACT

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The events of September 11, 2001 and subsequently the onset of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan served as the driving force behind implementing immediate change in the way we train and prepare Soldiers to meet the challenges of today's asymmetric battle space. The Army's senior leadership quickly realized that many of our Soldiers were deploying into combat zones within 30 to 60 days upon completing Advanced Individual Training and One Station Unit Training. Input from Combatant Commanders cited many of these Soldiers were inadequately prepared physically, mentally and tactically for the challenges they would face on the volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. For many of these Soldiers it was their first field training exercise after graduation, which included lethal combat patrols, manning checkpoints and convoy security. To that end, this paper will examine the transformation process, discuss the implementation strategy and challenges the Army faced in its effort to better prepare Soldiers for combat. While this document will cover the full spectrum of Initial Entry Training, it will lend more focus towards Basic Combat Training.

TRANSFORMING INITIAL ENTRY TRAINING TO SUPPORT A NATION AT WAR

In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military

—General MacArthur (1933)

Overview

“Transforming our nation’s military capabilities while at war requires a careful balance between sustaining and enhancing the capabilities of current forces to fight wars and win the peace while investing in the capabilities of future forces.”¹ As such, transforming Initial Entry Training while fully engaged in two simultaneous conflicts and while converting the Army to a modular force required not only a deliberate and well-conceived plan, but an implementation strategy that would have minimum impact on the strategic flow of Soldiers to Combatant Commanders. More importantly, integrating new strategic initiatives into the training base, while at war, could easily create an imbalance between available forces and Soldiers being maintained in a Transient, Trainee, Holding, and Student (TTHS) status.

As military efforts in Iraq moved into phase IV operations, the United States political and military leadership quickly realized that we had stumbled into a type of unconventional, asymmetric warfare (roadside bombing, suicide bombing, urban operations, etc.) that clearly had not been anticipated. The reality of young American Soldiers being killed on a daily basis was being broadcast into every American living room nightly and quickly brought into question the level of Soldier preparedness. The strategic and political implications of developing effective tactics, techniques, and procedures to counter this asymmetric threat would prove to be pivotal to the well being and the credibility of the force. As the enemy continued to adapt his fighting techniques, the United States had to adapt to and develop counter measures to his technical and tactical changes in near real time. Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to counter the enemy’s demonstrated capabilities in both Iraq and Afghanistan, would soon find their way into in-theater and pre-deployment training for units and individual augmentees. The critical step was to embed these TTPs in CONUS based training practices not only to reduce the training burden on the war fighter in theater but begin the process of preparing Soldiers to face the asymmetric challenges of 21st century warfare. As the Army senior leadership decided to incorporate these TTPs into Enlisted Initial Entry Training (IET), it utilized lessons learned from Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom to establish the way ahead for future training. The increasing number of the Soldiers deploying into combat zones within 30 to 60 days of

completing Initial Entry Training provided the impetus to embed these training practices into the IET process as soon as possible.

Soldiers now progress through the five phases of IET with a higher level of proficiency in TTP inspired tasks than ever before. “Along the way, they discover a higher level of self-confidence and an inner strength they will utilize from their first units of assignment and beyond.”² There is a well-defined link between training objectives, exercise design, and performance assessment. “Event-based techniques and scenarios guide the design of tactical training opportunities by systematically introducing events within training exercises that provide known opportunities for Drill Sergeants to observe and give direct feedback through an after action review process.”³ As the Army’s role expands, Initial Entry Training must stand ready with processes and products that support Combatant Commanders with well-trained, highly adaptable Soldiers for current and future battlefields. To do less than provide the most effective training to combat the asymmetric threat will negatively impact morale and lead to discrediting the force as a reliable instrument of national power.

This research paper will provide a historical perspective of IET, detailed analysis of the transformation process and implementation strategy as well as discuss the impact to the training base and Combatant Commanders. Last, it will discuss the work remaining to be done and the accomplishments of the transformation efforts in IET.

Posture of Initial Entry Training Prior to Change

The first and traditional model (since Post WWII) is a combination of Basic Combat Training and Advanced Individual Training. Today this model is primarily used to train Soldiers with military occupational skills in the Combat Support and Combat Service Support Branches (Signal, Transportation, Quartermaster, Military Intelligence, etc). Under this model, it is common for Soldiers to receive Basic Combat Training, the first 3 phases, at one installation, and then move to other installations throughout the country to complete phases 4 and 5 of their Advance Individual Training, where they learn their specific military occupational skills. The 2nd model, which we have been using since the 1980’s is called One Station Unit Training. All requisite training is completed at one installation. This model is used for the larger military occupational specialties; primary the larger Combat Arms Branches (Infantry, Armor, but also Engineer, Military Police). Unlike the previous model, OSUT Soldiers progress through all 5 phases of training with the same s they started training with and will keep many of the same Drill Sergeants and Instructors thru the duration of the course.⁴

Prior to implementing dramatic changes in October 2004, Soldier preparedness in Basic Combat Training focused heavily on soldierization skills such as drill & ceremony, saluting properly, rank structure, and history of the U.S. Army. Tactical training and testing was conducted in a somewhat sterile environment, specifically Soldiers were not experiencing

tactical training under realistic, stressful, field conditions. The Army accepted risks in Initial Entry Training as it relied heavily upon operational units to augment individual Soldier skills before deploying them into a combat zone. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) conducted Basic Combat Training during an eight-hour training day with very little formal training being conducted on Saturday and Sunday and limited field training (72 hours) throughout the nine-week training cycle. Soldiers went through three, three-week phases of hands-on training followed by a performance test at the conclusion of each phase as depicted in Figure 1 below. These training practices bore little resemblance to the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) being applied on the asymmetric battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan.




Figure 1. BCT/FIRST 9 Weeks of OSUT Prior to Change⁵

Impetus for Change

"The dramatic transformation of America's strategic environment had a major impact on our military forces, and demanded an equally dramatic transformation of how we prepare Soldiers for combat and non-combat operations."⁶ To that end, the Army Chief of Staff directed TRADOC in January 2004, to conduct a holistic review all Initial Entry Training practices to ensure Soldiers were adequately prepared for the rigors of the contemporary operating environment. Most notable among the reasons for this change was the increasing number of the Soldiers deploying into combat zones within 30 to 60 days of completing Initial Entry Training. Second, input from Combatant Commanders and veterans of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) cited deficiencies in a number of key areas, such as fratricide and injury due to negligent discharge of weapons, urban and convoy operations, patrolling, checkpoint operations, field sanitation and hygiene, improvised explosive devices,

night operations, and combat lifesaver techniques. More important, the contemporary operating environment dictated that Soldiers become more tactically proficient, physically mentally tough, and adaptive to urban environments. As TRADOC embarked on the process of transforming Initial Entry Training, the United States Accessions Command would spearhead that change.

Holistic Review of Initial Entry Training

In February 2004, the United States Army Accessions Command convened a Task Force at Fort Knox, Kentucky, for the sole purpose of reviewing and revamping existing IET Programs of Instruction (POI) with a primary focus on BCT. TRADOC Commander's stated objectives were:

- Assess how the Army is conducting Initial Entry Training to meet the needs of the Commandant Commanders' efforts to combat asymmetric threats.
- Develop an adaptive strategy for the future training adjustments
- Determine executable training within projected resource constraints.

To address these objectives, the Task Force took a systemic but iterative approach to this massive undertaking. The composition of the Task Force was absolutely critical to the process. The Task Force included a full spectrum of senior leadership subject matter experts from the operational, institutional (IET), and installation management communities.

As a precursor to developing viable options, the Task Force leadership took a series of initial steps towards collecting vital data inputs. The first and probably most dynamic step was the observation and data collection from external agencies and services. Those sources included the Special Forces Preparation and Conditioning Course, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Advanced Individual Training, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Center for Army Lessons Learned, United Kingdom Training Regiment, and Louisville Kentucky Police Academy. The insights gained from these observations provided a strong foundation for developing the transformation strategy. These insights included concepts of cultural shifts in instruction and training methodology (adaptive, repetitive and event-based/scenario training), increased field and weapons training, leader-to-led ratios, standards and privileges. Divided into five focus groups, the Task Force focused on warrior ethos, culture, organization and structure, training, and recruiting/IET integration.

Transformation Process

The key to the transformation process was skillfully nesting wartime training requirements within well established BCT and AIT Programs of Instruction. The transformation strategy and processes centered on the common theme of Rigor and Relevance. The ways, ends, and

means for transforming Initial Entry Training are depicted in Figure 2. This concept continues to serve as the fundamental basis for making periodic revisions to the Initial Entry Training Program of Instruction, particularly Basic Combat Training. Transforming Advance Individual Training would differ in its approach and implementation primarily because of its technical training focus. The transformation baseline architecture hinged on a number of key factors, most notable were alignment with Combatant Commanders common skills training priorities and available resources.




Figure 2. Task Force IET Transformation Strategy

Even though the focus groups began with very open-ended guidance, the primary focus of the IET transformation process was clearly on the Soldier war fighting abilities and capabilities. The group dynamics, a quality mix of operational and institutional military and civilian leadership, played a critical role in terms of iterative and realistic approaches and solution sets.

Warrior Ethos

Army Values has long been a part of a Soldier's vernacular. In an effort to move beyond the Army Values, the Task Force determined that all Soldiers should be imbued with the tenets of the warrior culture. Warrior ethos concerns character, shaping who you are and what you do. In that sense, it is clearly linked to the Army values. Warrior ethos requires unrelenting and

consistent determination to do what is right and do it with pride, both in war and peacetime operations.

Warrior Ethos refers to the professional attitudes and beliefs that characterize the American. At its core, the warrior ethos grounds itself on the refusal to accept failure. The Army has forged the warrior ethos on training grounds from Valley Forge to the Combined Training Centers and honed it in battle from Bunker Hill to San Juan Hill, from the Meuse-Argonne to Omaha Beach, from Pork Chop Hill to the Ia Drang Valley, from Salinas Airfield to the Battle of 73 Easting. It derives from the unique realities of battle. It echoes through the precepts in the Code of Conduct. Developed through discipline, commitment to Army values, and knowledge of the Army's proud heritage, the warrior ethos makes clear that military service is much more than just another job: the purpose of winning the nation's wars calls for total commitment.

Warrior ethos is a crucial but perishable mindset, and as such, the Warrior Ethos and Soldiers' Creed became a key requirement for consideration. The ability to forge victory out of the chaos of battle includes overcoming fear, hunger, deprivation, and fatigue. Thus, the warrior ethos for Soldiers is about more than persevering under the worst of conditions; it fuels the fire to fight through those conditions to victory no matter how long it takes, no matter how much effort is required. The Army continues to affirm, develop and sustain it.

Culture

"Training transformation begins by changing the way people think and the way organizations operate."⁷ Changing the culture would begin with the changing the mindset and traditional behaviors of the leadership. Programs of Instruction would require revision to reflect the desired Warrior Culture. Leadership courses targeted for revision included but were not limited to Drill Sergeant School, instructor training courses, cadre training courses, Pre-Command Courses, Warrior Leader's Course, and the Company Commander/First Sergeant Course. Additionally, TRADOC Regulation 350-6 Enlisted Initial Training Policies and Administration and TRADOC Regulation 350-16 Drill Sergeant Program would also require major revisions to reflect doctrinal changes.

In the Department of Defense Transformation Planning Guidance, Secretary Rumsfeld stated, "We must transform not only the capabilities at our disposal, but the way we think, the way we train, the way we exercise, and the way we fight."⁸ Traditional Drills Sergeant practices such as the Shock and Awe treatment, shouting, screaming, and breaking Soldiers down, were specifically targeted for removal. Training Soldiers to obey was no longer enough. Training them to think and serve as a sensor and a member of a team would become the basis for integrating Soldiers into the Army. Increasing the rigor of BCT, AIT, and OSUT and changing leadership

practices provided considerable momentum toward changing the culture. Rigor events considered for upgrade included higher physical fitness standards, night firing, NBC standards, combatives, and land navigation among others. Other cultural changes considered involved moving away from the traditional lecture in the bleachers to a performance oriented, crawl-walk-run methodology and independent training events to tactically linked scenarios. If approved by the Army Chief of Staff and the TRADOC Commander, this cultural shift would have a far-reaching impact on Initial Entry Training.

Structure

TRADOC lacked much of the structure to effectively facilitate changes in training. Structural changes for BCT, OSUT, and AIT would require additional personnel, a massive infusion of equipment, new facilities, range expansion and more ammunition. Such adjustments would mean adjusting units' Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) and Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDA). More importantly, it would mean competing for very scarce resources.

With the infusion of additional training tasks and skills, Drill Sergeants would need to provide considerable more direct individual attention and involvement to smaller groups of Soldiers. The Task Force determined that a 1:10 leader-to led ratio in BCT and the BCT phase of OSUT should provide the resources to effectively address a myriad of issues such as small-group, event-based training versus lectures, individual group mentoring vice focused attention on the bottom 5% of Soldiers, and guiding and shaping training as oppose to pushing Soldiers to simply get them through each training day. "The proposed requirement of Drill Sergeants would increase from 2718 to 3072, overall 480 new Drill Sergeant for a 17.7% increase in requirements."⁹ Solutions to the problem of increasing the number of Drill Sergeant in the training bases included increased utilization of the Reserve Component Division Institutional Training (DIV-IT) organizations, allowing Sergeants (E-5) to serve as Drill Sergeants, and removing Drill Sergeants from AIT collectively and placing the tactical and technical training responsibility on the instructors and support cadre. Again, the common theme would be competing for manpower resources, particularly reserve component force structure being utilized in OEF and OIF.

Initial resource assessments for incorporating the Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills into the existing POI required a massive infusion of weapons, equipment, ammunition, MOUT facilities, new and upgraded ranges, and simulations into the training base. Figure 3 below provides only a snapshot and rough order of magnitude of the amount weapons, night vision devices and

optics, facilities, and ammunition for BCT and OSUT alone. AIT requirements were even greater. Many of these items were in high demand from the operational Army. There were a number of options and variations to this solution set, but it was clear that without the aforementioned structural modifications, training would not reflect transformation. The long pole in the tent would be resourcing. To that end, the Army would have to absorb this unfinanced requirement and find a way to provide the necessary resources in a timely manner.

WEAPONS	M4 / M16A4	M240B	M249	M2	MK19
TOTAL	550 / 1,266	1400	6500	150	110

NIGHT SIGHTS	AV/PVS 4	AN/PAS 13	AN/TVS 5	AN/PEQ 2A	AN/PAQ 4	AN/PVS 14	M68 (CCO)
TOTAL	463	420	353	120	1,650	3,360	1,995

OTHER EQUIPMENT/ AMMO	AN/PRC-119F	MOUT FACILITIES	5.56/ 40 MM	.50 CAL
TOTAL	1745	5	23 mil/ 117K	5.2 mil

Figure 3. BCT & OSUT Mission Essential Equipment Requirements¹⁰

Training

Within the transformation construct, “training deficiencies such as executing battle tasks wearing a full compliment of battle gear under realistic, stressful field environments, movement techniques above the buddy team level, firing weapons at night using night vision devices, entering, clearing, firing into or from a building, reacting without warning to contact while in a vehicle as part of a convoy, quickly stood out as shortfalls of the IET POI.”¹¹ Veterans of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom provided evidence of these deficiencies through the Army Chief of Staff initiated Review of Education, Training, and Assignment for Leaders (RETAL) Study. The RETAL survey specifically targeted Army leaders, Officers and Noncommissioned Officers, both combat veterans and non-combat veterans, within the full spectrum of combat arms, combat support and combat service support for feedback about the shortfalls of Basic Combat Training. They were asked to provide input as to what they thought were the most critical tasks the Soldiers should be performing to better prepare them for today’s contemporary operating environment. Utilizing input from the field and survey results of the RETAL Study, the Task Force developed a list of Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills they

considered essential for every Soldier, regardless of Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), to either master (qualification) or become familiar (exposure) with.

Figure 4 outlines the tasks and drills in the categories of shoot, communicate, urban operations, move, and fight that were developed to provide the necessary rigor and relevance needed for today's asymmetric battlefield. The nine battle drills were specifically selected to improve Soldier survivability. These battle drills were designed to provide Soldiers with the knowledge and skills required to respond quickly and correctly to the most likely situations they might face in combat. These tasks and drills were aligned with Iraq and Afghanistan in-theater and pre-deployment training requirements. Of particular note, only 16 out of 39 tasks and three of nine drills were being trained in Basic Combat Training at that time of the Task Force creation. Even fewer were being conducted in Advance Individual Training. These tasks and drills would move forward for approval.




Figure 4. Initial Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills¹²

Recruiting/IET Integration

On average, it cost the Army approximately \$15,000 to recruit one Soldier. To that end, it was incumbent on the United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) to recruit high caliber citizen-Soldiers. The first and foremost demand was for USAREC to recruit quality Soldiers, i.e., high school graduates, drug free, no criminal record and meeting height/weight

standards and minimize the number of marginal recruits who were ill-suited for the Army. Second, USAREC and the Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) should conduct a more thorough background analysis of each recruit to ensure only those meeting the standard continued to move through the processes and continue their integration into the training base. Additionally, USAREC reviewed its processes of placing Soldiers in the Delayed Entry Program (DEP) and determining what training could be accomplished and monitored while recruits awaited ship dates from their home of record to the MEPS and onward to Basic Combat Training. Last, the Task Force Recruiting and Integration Team looked at gender, larger incentives linked to certain occupational specialties and service obligation, and education. Historically, recruits with General Educational Development (GED) certifications and women dropped out at a higher rate than men and those with a high school diploma.

Other Options

Other options considered were the increases in the course length of Basic Combat Training from nine weeks up to 12 weeks, increased course lengths in AIT on a case-by-case basis, and removing One Station Unit Training as a training model. These options would have major impacts on the training base but more importantly, on the Army. Maintaining Soldiers in the training base for an additional three weeks would increase an already over-populated Transient, Trainee, Holding, and Student (TTHS) Account and exponentially increasing all other resource requirements. More important, it would adversely impact the flow of Soldiers to the Combatant Commanders and the operational Army.

Approved Changes

With the full support of the Army Chief of Staff, the Commanding General, TRADOC approved the IET Task Force recommendations, but with very specific guidance: Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills would be incorporated into IET as defined by the Task Force. To avoid disrupting the flow of Soldiers, Basic Combat Training would only increase by one day and not three weeks as recommended. BCT was directed to increase the training day from eight to ten hours and the training week from AIT had the flexibility to increase the POI with the approval of the TRADOC Commander; Drill Sergeants could be enhanced over-time, but Drill Sergeants would remain in AIT until a further study could be accomplished. Additionally, he approved the cultural shift, recruiting strategy, leadership training and the equipment resourcing strategy.

Transformation Implementation Processes

The TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Training assumed responsibility for implementing the Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills on 27 Oct 04. With the Commanding General TRADOC's guidance clearly articulated, the TRADOC staff established an implementation action plan that was time-phased, iterative and in most cases included simultaneous actions. Basic Combat Training was the priority of effort. The initial implementation plan was a phased process: general guidance to the Proponent Schools, identification of resource shortfalls, revising doctrine and TTPs, and providing progressive Monthly TRADOC Training Center Assessment (TTCA) briefings to Army-Vice Chief of Staff and Headquarters Department of the Army (DA) Staff Principles.

Phase I: Implementation Guidance 13 Jan 2005

Basic Combat Training and One Station Unit Training

1. BCT and OSUT will execute all Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills.
2. Execute a Convoy Live Fire Exercise IAW the Convoy Live Fire Exercise Training Support Package (TSP).¹³

Advanced Individual Training

3. AIT Course lengths greater than six weeks, will qualify with their assigned weapon.
4. AIT Proponent School Commandants and Commanders will determine any additional Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills trained for specific MOSs including Intra-Service Training MOSs.
5. The Convoy Live Fire Exercise for other AITs is not mandated. Commandants will determine the execution methodology either to conduct a Convoy Live Fire Exercise or non-live fire Convoy Training Exercise.¹⁴

Phase II: Implementation Guidance 7 Apr 2006

Basic Combat Training and One Station Unit Training

The second phase of implementation provided changes in ammunition authorizations for M2 and MK-19 familiarization firing in BCT and OSUT as a reduction in ammunition for the M2 from 50 rounds to 36 rounds and MK-19 will be reduced from 18 rounds to 10 rounds as outlined in FM 3-22.27 and FM 3-22.65. This reduction reflected the total rounds for both day and night fire.¹⁵

AIT Training

The second phase of implementation included changes in rifle marksmanship and Convoy Live Fire requirements.

1. AIT courses 23 weeks and greater will continue to re-qualify with individually assigned weapons. Soldiers attending AIT courses lasting less than 23 weeks are no longer required to re-qualify.
2. All AITs will conduct ARM training using the EST 2000 or live-fire, at the Commandant's discretion, regardless of course length. The EST 2000 would be used to Engage targets with M240B, M249, M2, MK-19.¹⁶

The incorporation of the Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills (WTBD) along with the other approved changes reshaped the training construct within the BCT. As reflected in Figure 5, the most notable changes included an aggressive daily/weekly training schedule, added Situational Training Exercises (STX) and increased Field Training Exercises, increased Advanced Rifle Marksmanship, and Convoy Live Fire training vignettes. Feedback from OIF and OEF combat veterans, strongly support training the current WTBD in Initial Entry Training to prepare Soldiers for combat. Both FORSCOM and Theater-specific directed training mandated many of the WTBDs be trained prior to deploying to theater. Clearly this step reduced the training burden on the war fighting Combatant Commander.




Figure 5. BCT/First 9 Weeks of OSUT Today¹⁷

Transformation Challenges and Solutions

The greatest challenge to implementing the transformation strategy was resources. TRADOC lacked many of the personnel, facilities, range capacity, weapons and vehicles to effectively accomplish the training. The greatest challenge to TRADOC was competing for the same resources and equipment as the operational Army, particularly those engaged in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. TRADOC became very innovative in its approach to developing short-term solutions to long-term issues. For example, the purchase of the Engagement Skills Trainer (EST 2000) allowed IET Soldiers to enhance rifle marksmanship skills while simultaneously saving ammunition and range capacity as depicted in Figure 6. The redistribution of phased out M16A1s provided weapons immersion training. It was through the efforts of keen leaders to make good-enough adaptations of existing resources until funding and resources matched the training requirements that the training was able to move forward.

Engagement Skills Trainer (EST 2000)

- **The EST 2000 is a multipurpose weapons trainer which provides training support for both individual and crew served weapons through three primary training modes: marksmanship, collective battlefield scenarios, and shoot/don't-shoot judgmental use of force**
- **Actual weapons modified for training are used to accurately replicate the physical and operational characteristics of the weapon being simulated providing the Soldier with the look, feel, and performance of the actual weapon**
- **Facilitates training the following Warrior Tasks & Battle Drills:**
 - **Engage targets with M16, M9, M203, M240B MG, M249 MG, M2 MG, MK-19**



Figure 6. Engagement Skills Trainer (EST 2000)¹⁸

Infusing the WTBDs into the training base required more Drill Sergeants and support personnel. TRADOC looked at a number of other personnel options, which included increasing the utilization of Reserve Component Division Institutional Training (DIV-IT), increasing the

number of E-7/6 Drill Sergeants, and approving use of Sergeants (E5) to serve as Drill Sergeants. It was a combination of the three that initially afforded TRADOC the flexibility to meet the training requirement while simultaneously enhancing the leader-to-led ratios.

Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills Re-look

In March 2006 the Commanding General, United Army Accessions Command (USAAC) directed a second detailed assessment of the Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills in Initial Entry Training to ensure they were still consistent with in-theater and pre-deployment training requirements. Under the direction of the G-3 USAAC, Task Force Warrior was formed at Fort McPherson, Georgia. The Commanding General, USAAC issued guidance to the Task Force. It included Items 1-5 listed below. (These are 5 of 8 of the items cited on the Certificate of Charter- TF Warrior.)

1. Conduct an assessment of the WTBDs and determine the tasks and drills we must train now and in the future. Make specific recommendations for Convoy Live Fire, Soldier as a Sensor, IED detection and defeat, night infiltration, patrolling, and first aid.
2. Develop a strategy that prepares Soldiers for combat as well as training that will occur under the Army Force Generation (ARFOGEN) model.
3. Consider lessons learned and TTPs from OIF and OEF. Make recommendations on what to stop doing, i.e., non-relevant tasks.
4. Provide rough order of magnitude for resource requirements.
5. Determine a way ahead, laying out a 2-year plan with milestones.¹⁹

Again, the composition of the Task Force was absolutely critical to the process. Task Force Warrior differed in its composition and focus from Task Force IET. The composition of the Task Force included a limited number of senior subject matter experts from the USAAC, TRADOC, FORSCOM, Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM), Center for Army Lessons Learned, U.S. Army Reserve Component and elements from the National Training Center. The Task Force carefully reviewed and weighed the Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills and other major training events against Central Command's (CENTCOM) theater specific training requirements and FORSCOM, 1st Army, XVII Airborne Corps, and 101st Air Assault Division's pre-deployment tasks to ensure they were nested. The Center for Army Lessons Learned and survey results from the most current RETAL study showed the current IET training practices provided the right emphasis and focus on the majority of the necessary tactical and survival skills. The Task Force determined that other key elements should be added to the Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills and to the IET POI at large. These training events included escalation of

force, combat life saving (minus certification), vehicle rollover drills, and detainee operations at the point of capture. Figure 7 below outlines the revisions to the tasks and drills.




Figure 7. New Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills²⁰

There were also a number of tasks that they considered as less relevant and recommended for removal from training. In the larger scheme of things, the equipment to support added training events was marginal and could be easily supported. Because of the fluidity for the Contemporary Operating Environment and rapid changes to TTPs, the Task Force determined that a semi-annual review was necessary to ensure the training base kept pace with the operational Army.

The CG, USAAC approved the recommendations in April 2006. The 16 Jun 2006 Phase III Implementation Guidance went out to the individual training sites. The end result of the revisions to the Warrior Tasks and Drills modified and increased the tasks from 39 to 41 and the drills from 9 to 11.

Future Changes

There is still a considerable amount of work to be done to ensure TRADOC trains and prepares Soldiers to meet the challenges for the future. Currently, there are several concepts under consideration to create greater efficiencies while maintaining training effectiveness. TRADOC is considering removing Drill Sergeants from all AIT units in a effort to gain greater efficiencies in BCT. The concept is to the replace Drill Sergeants with a dual hatted Platoon Sergeant/platform instructor. Currently there are four ongoing pilot programs at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Fort Bliss, Fort Jackson and Fort Lee to determine the feasibility of making such a dramatic change. Results of these pilot programs will be briefed to TRADOC leadership on/around Feb 2007.

The second concept under consideration is Ability Group Batching. Within the construct of this concept, Soldiers will be placed into ability groups after an initial of physical fitness, mental aptitude, leadership potential, physical health, etc. The bottom line is that many of the Soldiers arrive at AIT at varying levels mental and physical capabilities and this process allows designated Soldiers to move through the training cycle sooner. "The expectation of this process is to assist ARFORGEN in manning goals, especially in critical MOS to reduce TTHS and provide an even greater pool of Soldiers to the operational force."²¹

Last, TRADOC is now determining the impact of a six-day per week training schedule in AIT. Soldiers in BCT and OSUT currently train to a 6.5 weekly training cycle. The concept is to conduct all technical training Monday through Friday and focus solely on tactical training (Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills) on Saturdays. This process will make a better and more efficient use of collective time to train on tactical tasks.

Conclusion

TRADOC transformed and implemented an effective training strategy that has added relevant and vital war fighting skills and increased Soldier's effectiveness and survivability on today's asymmetric battlefield. This was no easy task given this transformation process was accomplished while executing two simultaneous conflicts and transforming the Army structure into a modular force with competition for the same critical resources. This transformation effort had a minimum impact to the flow of Soldiers to Combatant Commanders. The impact of unforecasted and unfinanced resource requirements were minimized by developing 'good enough' training concepts through the use of simulations and commercial off the shelf equipment as the Army worked through major sustainment issues relating to the reset/train, ready and available phases of Army Force Generation (ARFOGEN).

TRADOC now provides better-trained and prepared Soldiers to the Combatant Commanders, who can quickly and easily assimilate into the warfight. The development of an adaptive and flexible training strategy coupled with validated relevant tasks and drills is now being applied across the full spectrum of training, specifically in the Basic Officers Leadership Course (BOLC) as well as the Basic Non-commissioned Officers Course (BNCOC). This strategy clearly provides a-way-ahead for quickly adapting wartime TTPs into the training base. More importantly, the successful documentation of these current training practices ensures consistency in tasks, condition and standards across the Army. The result is a more effective Soldier and thus a more effective force.

Recommendations

“Transforming is about more than developing new strategies and structures, it is about changing culture, about encouraging new ways of thinking so that we can develop new ways of fighting and provide our armed forces the tools they need to defend our way of life,”²² said Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. The path to this cultural change will take the services through a transformation Department of Defense training.

The reader can clearly see that the burden of affecting these changes made consideration of the following recommendations impossible. As the current training mechanisms achieve stability, the next logical step will be to move to the next level. To that end these recommendations are offered for consideration.

As TRADOC progresses towards more adaptive and relevant training practices in Initial Entry Training, it should strongly consider the establishment of Joint Basic Training vignettes. If we are truly to train the way we fight, joint and interoperable basic combat training is a construct that should be explored. The ability to link geographically separated training venues such as service ranges; training areas and facilities would add an effective training dimension at the entry Soldier level. We must embrace the concept of Network Centric Training (NCT) in IET. Transformation is not simply focused on technological solutions, but rather on how these solutions affect individual and collective training in our joint forces. NCT is about enhancing combat power through shared awareness and training. At the center of network centric operations, is written doctrine that maintains pace with it. TRADOC must continue the periodic-annual review of the Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills and other training practices to ensure it delivers the most effective and well prepared Soldier to the future. Additionally, in an effort to keep the training base relevant and ready, the Army’s senior leadership must ensure OEF, OIF

and other combat veterans must be assigned proportionally to the training base to bring their current experiences.

Endnotes

¹ U.S. Department of the Army, United States Army Transformation Roadmap, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army 1 Nov 2003), II.

² *Fort Jackson Home Page*, available from <http://www.jackson.army.mil>: Internet; accessed 29 November 2006

³ Jennifer Fowlkes, Daniel J. Dwyer, Randall L. Oser, Eduardo Salas, "Event Based Approach to Training (EBAT)," *International Journal of Aviation Psychology*, 1 Apr 2005 [online publication]; available from http://www.leaonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/s15327108ijap0803_3; Internet; accessed 29 November 2006.

⁴ Douglas J. Knight, "Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills, Adding Rigor and Relevance," briefing slides with scripted commentary, TRADOC, Fort Monroe, 19 June 06.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, Training Transformation Implementation Plan, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 10 June 2003), 3.

⁷ Ibid

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Colonel James Greer, "The IET Review Task Force." briefing slides, Fort Monroe. 23 Feb 2004.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Douglas J. Knight, "Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills, Adding Rigor and Relevance," briefing slides with scripted commentary, TRADOC, Fort Monroe, 19 June 06.

¹³ U.S. Training and Doctrine Command, "Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills Implementation Plan," memorandum, Fort Monroe, 13 Jan 2005.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ U.S. Training and Doctrine Command, "Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills Implementation Plan," memorandum, Fort Monroe, 7 Apr 2006.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Douglas J. Knight, "Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills, Adding Rigor and Relevance," briefing slides with scripted commentary, TRADOC, Fort Monroe, 19 June 06.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Colonel Kevin Shwedo, "Task Force Warrior - Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills Review," briefing slides, Fort McPherson, March 06.

²⁰ Edwin Kuster, "The IET Review." briefing slides, Fort Monroe. Sep 2006.

²¹ Colonel Kevin Shwedo, "Advance Individual Training (AIT) Ability Group Batching," briefing slides, Fort Monroe, 22 Sep 06.

²² Paul Mayberry, Training Together and Fighting Together, Training and Simulation Journal June/July 2003, Internet; accessed 9 January 2007

